










THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS: 
REPLICATING – AND EXTENDING –  








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2017 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS: 
REPLICATING – AND EXTENDING –  





Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that presidential regimes and majoritarian election systems 
have important effects on fiscal policy, government effectiveness and productivity. Here, their 
dataset is extended in a number of ways: the number of countries included is increased from 
85 to up to 116, and more recent data for both government effectiveness and productivity are 
used. In replicating and extending their analyses, we find that the effect of presidential 
regimes on all three groups of economic variables vanishes almost entirely. With regard to 
electoral systems, the original results are largely confirmed: majoritarian (as opposed to 
proportional) electoral systems lead to lower government expenditure, lower levels of rent 
seeking but also lower output per worker. The institutional details such as the proportion of 
candidates that are not elected via party lists and the district magnitude have proved to be of 
particular importance. The question whether societies can improve their lot by choosing 
specific constitutional rules remains open. 
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The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating – and Extending – Persson 
and Tabellini 
1 Introduction 
In their monograph “The Economic Effects of Constitutions”, Torsten Persson and 
Guido Tabellini (for short PT, 2003) ask whether specific constitutional rules cause 
systematic differences in economic outcomes. More specifically, PT ask what 
economic effects two constitutional institutions, namely the form of government 
(presidential vs. parliamentary systems) and the electoral system (majoritarian vs. 
proportional, but also size of the electoral district, number of individual vs. list 
candidates) have on three groups of economically relevant variables: (1) fiscal policy 
(government expenditure, tax revenue, budget surplus, share of social welfare 
spending), (2) government efficiency (absence of corruption, graft) and (3) 
productivity (both labor and total factor productivity). Their results are striking: All 
else equal, presidential systems have significantly lower government expenditure than 
parliamentary systems, but also lower tax revenue, a lower budget deficit, and spend 
less on social and welfare programs. The results are similar – but substantially less 
significant – with regard to majoritarian systems. Most strikingly, if the presidential 
form of government and majoritarian electoral rules are combined, central 
government expenditure is more than 10 percent of GDP less than in the benchmark 
case of parliamentary government and proportional electoral rules! 
With regard to government efficiency, PT find the size of the electoral district and the 
proportion of candidates not nominated via party lists to be hugely influential. The 
larger the district size and the higher the share of individual candidates, the higher 
government efficiency turns out to be. Finally, presidential systems seem to be rather 
inimical to improvements in both labor and total factor productivity. These results 
are, however, only significant on the ten percent level. 
The book turned out to be an instant success. Simultaneously, the adequacy of the 
methods used by the two authors has been questioned. In his review for the Journal of 
Economic Literature, Daron Acemoglu (2005, 1033) writes: “If the results indeed 
correspond to the causal effects of the form of government and electoral rules on 
policies and economic outcomes as PT claim, we have learned more with this book 
than from the entire comparative politics literature of the past fifty years.” Yet, 
Acemoglu believes the if to be very big and continues: “Despite these remarkable   3
results, there are reasons to question whether this research has successfully uncovered 
causal effects. The OLS and matching estimates ultimately rely on the exogeneity of 
political institutions. Nevertheless, political institutions are equilibrium outcomes, 
determined by various social factors that are not fully controlled for in the empirical 
models.” Acemoglu’s critique suggests that the search for better instruments ought to 
be on the agenda. Here, a different approach is chosen: PT rely on two data sets, their 
larger one encompasses 85 countries. We wanted to know whether their results are 
robust to the inclusion of additional countries. We extend their data set with up to 31 
additional countries. It is noteworthy that the average of an indicator proxying for the 
degree of political rights and civil liberties that citizens enjoy (the Gastil Index) 
slighty improves as a consequence of this broader dataset. 
Based on the broader dataset, we find that the effects of presidential systems on fiscal 
policies largely vanish, whereas the effects of electoral rules could be replicated. 
With regard to government efficiency, the results are less clear-cut than in the PT 
sample. In many regressions the indicators used to proxy for the characteristics of the 
electoral system are not significant anymore. Concerning output per worker, PT find 
that both presidential government forms as well as majoritarian electoral rules have 
marginally significant negative effects. As soon as our larger sample is used, the 
results resemble the other findings: the presidential variable loses its significance 
whereas the negative effect of majoritarian electoral systems on output per worker are 
largely confirmed. The significance of both the proportion of individual candidates as 
well as the size of the electoral district could also be reconfirmed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes the PT results in a 
little more detail, the following section describes the various extensions to the PT 
datasets. Section 4 contains both the replications of the original PT estimates as well 
as a number of extensions. Section 5 concludes and discusses a number of open 
questions. 
2 Summarizing Persson and Tabellini 
2.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The most fundamental question of PT could be summarized as “Do constitutional 
rules have economically relevant effects?” More concretely, the authors ask whether 
different government forms (presidential vs. parliamentary systems) and electoral   4
systems (majoritarian vs. proportional, but also size of electoral districts and 
proportion of individual as opposed to list candidates) are correlated with a number of 
economically relevant variables. This section describes a number of theoretical 
conjectures according to which government form and electoral rules could have 
economically relevant effects (2.2), reports the criteria chosen by PT for ascertaining 
the two constitutional institutions as well as those used to choose the countries to be 
included in their database (2.3), depicts the dependent variables (2.4) and portrays the 
empirical results. 
2.2 The Underlying Theory 
Form of Government 
The conjecture that presidential systems can systematically create incentives different 
from parliamentary systems is inspired by the concept of separation of powers. The 
basic idea is that in presidential systems, the separation of powers is stronger than in 
parliamentary ones. In order to remain in power, most presidents do not depend on 
the continued support of the majority of parliament. In most parliamentary systems, 
the chief executive does, however, depend on being able to secure a parliamentary 
majority. In a number of previous papers, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997, 
2000) had argued that it was easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in 
parliamentary systems which is why they expect both higher tax rates as well as 
higher corruption levels than in presidential systems. They further argue that the 
majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending 
programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are 
able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) predict that both taxes and government 
expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. 
Electoral Rules 
The insight that electoral rules can have a crucial effect on the number of parties has 
been recognized for a long time. Duverger’s (1954) observation that constitutions 
providing for first-past-the-post or majority rule often induce two party systems, 
whereas systems that provide for proportional representation often induce the 
existence of more parties has even been coined “Duverger’s law” in order to express 
its general validity. Although this has been known for long, occupation with the 
economic consequences of electoral systems has just begun. It has been argued   5
(Austen-Smith 2000) that since the number of parties presented in parliament is 
higher under proportional representation, tax rates will not be decided upon by one 
single party but will be the result of legislative bargaining between a variety of parties 
with different constituents. This would explain that tax rates are, on average, higher 
under proportional representation than under majority rule. Lizzeri and Persico (2001) 
compare the composition of government spending under alternative electoral rules. 
They distinguish between the provision of a genuine public good on the one hand and 
of pork-barrel projects that serve redistributive purposes on the other and ask whether 
incentives to provide these goods differ systematically between systems with majority 
rule (called “winner-take-all systems” by them) and proportional representation. In 
majority rule systems, politicians have incentives to cater to the preferences of those 
who can help them to get the plurality of the votes. They will do so by promising 
pork barrel projects. In proportional representation systems, on the other hand, 
targeting makes less sense because every vote counts which is why politicians will 
provide more public goods. Their prediction is, hence, that the composition of the 
government budget will be different depending on the electoral regime. 
PT deal with two additional aspects of electoral systems, namely (1) district size and 
(2) ballot structure. District size refers to the number of legislators of a voting district. 
Suppose single member districts are combined with plurality rule. Under such an 
institutional setting, a party only needs some 25% of the national vote to win the 
elections (50% of half of the districts; Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Contrast this 
with a single national district that is combined with proportional representation. Here, 
a party needs some 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 
9) argue that this gives parties under proportional representation strong incentives to 
offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to 
focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted on the 
constituents’ preferences. 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) obtain a similar result. In large districts, 
legislators will primarily represent socioeconomic groups whereas in small districts, 
they will primarily represent geographical interests. Transfers would be a suitable 
instrument for paying allegiance to social constituencies whereas (local) public goods 
would be better suited for those paying geographical allegiance. They assume that in 
majoritarian systems just one representative is elected in each district, whereas in 
proportional systems, more than one representative is elected. Given this assumption, 
proportional systems will be spending more on transfers, whereas majoritarian   6
systems will be spending more on (local) public goods. They test their model with 20 
OECD and 20 Latin American countries and find that, as predicted, transfers are 
higher under proportional representation. Going beyond the simple dichotomy 
between majoritarian and proportional systems, they find that higher degrees of 
proportionality are correlated with higher degrees of transfer spending (as opposed to 
public goods spending). 
The effects of differences in the ballot structure is the last aspect of electoral systems 
to be considered. What is at stake here is how voters cast their ballots, i.e. whether 
they vote for individual candidates or for party lists. Often, majority rule systems rely 
on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems rely on party lists. Party lists 
can be interpreted as a common pool which means that individual candidates can be 
expected to invest less into their campaigns under proportional representation than 
under majority rule. Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 9) argue that corruption and 
political rents should be higher, the lower the ratio between individually elected 
legislators to legislators who are delegated by their parties. 
2.3 Operationalizing Institutions 
With regard to government forms, PT constructed a dummy variable which takes on a 
value of 1 in presidential regimes and 0 otherwise (PRES). All regimes in which the 
confidence of the lower house is not necessary for the executive to stay in power are 
defined as presidential, i.e. are coded 1. This implies that countries can be classified 
as presidential even if they do not have an elected president. Switzerland is, 
accordingly, coded as “presidential” although it does not have a directly elected 
president, whereas France is coded as “non presidential” because for his survival, the 
French prime minister depends on a confidence vote of parliament. 
Concerning electoral rules, PT also constructed a dummy variable. If the entire lower 
house in a country is elected under plurality rule, it takes on the value of 1, 0 
otherwise (MAJ). But relying exclusively on a dummy variable might be too coarse a 
brush. This is why PT constructed three more fine grained continuous measures: The 
first one is a proxy for the district magnitude defined here as the number of electoral 
districts divided by the number of legislators in the lower house. For the U.K., the 
variable MAGN takes on the value of 1, for Israel, which has one electoral district 
covering the entire nation, a value of close to 0. If all legislators are elected via party 
lists, voters will have a hard time monitoring their legislators, and it will be less risky   7
to be corrupt. This is why PT created a variable PIND that indicates the proportion of 
legislators elected by plurality rule via a vote on individuals (as opposed to party 
lists). For the U.K., it takes on the value of 1, for Poland the value of 0 because all of 
Poland’s legislators are elected via party lists. PIND combines two criteria, namely 
plurality rule and proportion of legislators elected via vote on individuals. The 
variable PINDO is constructed to capture the differences of closed lists only. It is 
defined as the proportion of legislators in the lower house elected individually or on 
open lists. Here, the UK is still coded 1, but Poland now also receives a 1 because it 
votes on open lists. 
Many formal rules are never enforced in reality. PT deal with this problem by 
introducing a cut-off criterion. Countries that do not meet it were not included into 
their sample. The cut-off criterion was the average of two indicators provided by the 
NGO Freedom House: political rights on the one hand and civil liberties on the other. 
PT call the average of these two indicators “GASTIL” commemorating the founder of 
the datasets. Freedom House codes the countries from 1 (“free”) to 7 (“nonfree”). In 
order to be included in their sample, the average of this score had to be lower than 5 
for the period from 1990 to 1998. 
2.4 The Dependent Variables 
PT deal with three groups of economically relevant variables, namely (1) fiscal 
policy, (2) rent extraction, and (3) productivity. In order to capture the effects of the 
constitutional institutions on fiscal policy, PT focus on the following variables (the 
panel covering the period from 1990 to 1998): 
-  Central government spending (social security included) as a percentage of GDP 
(CGEXP); 
-  Central government revenue as a percentage of GDP (CGREV); 
-  The level of social security and welfare spending by central government as a 
percentage of GDP (SSW); 
-  The size of the budget surplus of the central government as a percentage of 
GDP (SPL). 
To operationalize their second group, i.e. rent extraction, PT rely on the following 
indicators:   8
-  The average of the Corruption Perception Index as produced by Transparency 
International for the years 1995 to 2000 (recoded by PT such that 0 stands for 
perfectly clean and 10 for highly corrupt; CPI9500); 
-  A cluster of the governance indicators produced by Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
from the World Bank called “Graft” which is to capture the success of a society 
in developing an environment where fair and predictable rules form the basis of 
economic and social interactions, with perceptions of corruption playing a 
central role (GRAFT). 
-  Another cluster of the governance indicators is government effectiveness. It is 
to combine perceptions of quality of public service provision, the quality of a 
country’s bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, and their independence 
from political pressures (GOVEF). 
Finally, the two measures for productivity employed by PT are straightforward, both 
are taken from Hall and Jones (1999): 
-  Labor productivity (i.e. output per worker) for 1988 (LOGYL); 
-  Total factor productivity also for 1988 (LOGA). 
2.5 The Empirical Results 
Government Form 
PT’s results are quite impressive: (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP 
lower in presidential than in parliamentary systems. (2) The size of the welfare state 
is some two to three percent lower in presidential systems. (3) The influence of the 
government form on the budget deficit is rather marginal; the binary variable explains 
only a small proportion in the variation of budget deficits. (4) Presidential systems 
seem to have lower levels of corruption. (5) There are no significant differences in the 
level of government efficiency between the two forms of government. (6) Presidential 
systems seem to be a hindrance to increased productivity but this result is significant 
on the 10%-level only. 
Electoral Rules 
PT find that the electoral system has (economically and statistically) significant 
effects on a number of economic variables: (1) in majoritarian systems, central 
government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than in proportional   9
representation systems. (2) Expenditures for social services (“the welfare state”) are 
some 2 to 3% lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian 
systems is some 1 to 2% below that of systems with proportional representation. (4) 
A higher proportion of individually elected candidates does indeed lead to lower 
levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to 
have more corruption. (6) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates 
leads to higher output per worker. (7) Likewise, countries with smaller electoral 
districts tend to have lower output per worker. 
These results are stunning indeed. PT claim that the consequences of presidential 
regimes and majoritarian electoral systems are largely additive. If a parliamentary 
proportional country introduced a presidential-majoritarian system, government size 
would be decreased by a “whopping 10% of GDP” (PT 160). In the next section, we 
want to ask a number of questions regarding their approach, discuss a number of 
possible extensions and present some extensions factually carried out here. 
3 Extensions 
3.1 Possible Extensions 
At least four possible extensions come to mind: (1) the robustness of the results given 
that the codings are slightly modified, sample size is changed, outliers are 
included/excluded and the period for which the coefficients are estimated is changed. 
(2) Inclusion of additional control variables might change the results. (3) Given that 
the constitutional variables have any effects on the chosen dependent variables, one 
would like to know more about the transmission channels through which the effects 
are produced. (4) Institutions are man-made which means that there is always a 
potential endogeneity problem that needs to be dealt with. We now set out to deal 
with these possible extensions in a little more detail and begin with the robustness of 
the results. 
The results depend on the specific definition of the independent variables chosen. If 
minor modifications make the results disappear, they are not robust. Hence, a possible 
extension would be to rely on variables created for similar purposes but based on 
slightly different criteria. It could also be the case that dummy variables are too 
coarse and that the explicit recognition of additional criteria (president elected 
directly by population, by an electoral college or drawing on yet another election   10
mode?) would lead to more fine-grained indicators. But the exact delineation of the 
dependent variables is just as important. With regard to government expenditure – 
which is part of the group of fiscal policy variables – PT confine their analysis to 
central government expenditure whereas total government expenditure is not used. 
They motivate this choice by both better data availability and comparability (37f.) 
and argue that where both measures are available, they are highly correlated (r ≈ 0.9). 
Yet, it could be that their results are not robust to drawing on total government 
expenditure, and we propose to use it as an alternative dependent variable.1
Further, it could be that the cut-off criterion employed by PT introduces systematic 
bias into their regressions: Suppose that the large majority of countries excluded due 
to their bad rankings in political freedom and civil liberties were presidential systems. 
This could taint the results in favor of presidential systems. It might therefore make 
sense to broaden the dataset and check the robustness of the results by including a 
larger number of countries. Eventually, the results might also be influenced by a 
small number of outliers, hence explicitly checking whether the residuals are 
normally distributed could be an important check. 
We now move on to the second group of potential extensions dealing with control 
variables: In their paper on the effects of electoral systems on the amount of 
redistribution, Iversen and Soskice (2003) notice that three out of four governments 
under majoritarian systems have been center right between 1945 and 1998, whereas 
three out of four governments have been center-left under PR. But if that is the case, a 
closer look at the transmission mechanism that leads from electoral systems to 
government expenditures is needed because it is unclear if the difference is due to the 
constitutional rule or due to the different ideologies of government – and the 
population at large. A second possible extension would be to add control variables, 
e.g. one controlling for the ideological orientation of governments. 
This leads us directly to a third possible extension dealing with transmission 
channels. According to PT, presidential systems do better than parliamentary ones 
with regard to a number of different criteria. Yet, at the end of the day, when it comes 
                                                 
1   In a study that draws on the framework of PT but is interested in the economic effects of direct 
democracy, Voigt and Blume (2006) find that the distinction between total and central government 
expenditure (revenue) can be important: a higher degree of direct democracy is correlated with lower 
total government expenditure (albeit insignificantly) but also with higher central government revenue.   11
to income and growth (i.e. productivity development), parliamentary systems seem to 
have an advantage over presidential ones, if only on a low level of significance. Ex 
ante, the effects of fiscal policy on productivity are unclear because it can be both 
productivity enhancing as well as diminishing. Prima facie, one would, however, 
expect countries that have advantages in government efficiency to do better in terms 
of productivity. But this not what PT find. It would, hence, be interesting to inquire 
more specifically into the possible transmission channels through which the two 
constitutional institutions under consideration affect total factor productivity.  
The likelihood that formal institutions will be factually enforced possibly is a 
function of the kind of institution formally promulgated. It could, e.g., be that 
politicians have a higher likelihood of breaking with the rules of the game under 
presidential than under parliamentary institutions, although  the formal degree of 
separation is higher under the former. Presidents often claim that they are the only 
ones who represent the people as a whole. This might make them more audacious 
than, e.g., prime ministers in reneging upon constitutional constraints. Political parties 
are regularly weaker in presidential than in parliamentary systems.2 This might 
further increase the incentives of presidents not to take constitutional rules too 
seriously: if parties are weak, the possibility to produce opposition against a president 
who reneges upon the constitution might be less than in systems with strong political 
parties. A reduced likelihood of opposition does, of course, make reneging upon 
constitutional rules more beneficial. There might be yet another transmission 
mechanism concerned with political parties. Brennan and Kliemt (1994) show that 
organizations like political parties often develop longer time horizons than individual 
politicians: whereas presidents will be out after one or two terms (as in Mexico or the 
U.S.), political parties might opt for staying in power indefinitely (like in Japan). If 
the discount rate of presidents is indeed higher than that of, say, prime ministers or 
party leaders, this might also let offenses against formal constitutional rules appear 
more beneficial to presidents than to prime ministers. It would, hence, be desirable to 
                                                 
2   “Strong” and “weak” here refers to the organizational structure of parties; they are called “strong” if 
they have many paying members who are active in both political office but also follow political events 
closely. Due to the organizational structure, strong political parties have the capacity to mobilize many 
people within a short period of time. This might enable them to produce focal points different from 
those that the executive would like to create. Executives in an environment with strong parties are 
expected to be more likely to play by the constitutional rules than executives in an environment with 
weak parties.   12
have a better metric allowing to compare systematically the differences between 
constitutional institutions and constitutional reality. 
These arguments thus call for a third extension, namely to deal more closely with the 
transmission mechanisms at play here. It might make sense to think about additional 
independent variables: It could, e.g., be that the willingness to pay taxes is a 
reflection of the perceived legitimacy of a political system which might, in turn, 
depend on some constitutional institutions. 
A fourth potential extension is to take the endogeneity of constitutional rules 
explicitly into account. PT call their book “The Economic Effects of Constitutions”. 
Thus, they do not try to explain the emergence of different forms of government in 
any detail. Institutions are, however, always man-made and it is hence critical to 
adequately control for that. A possible extension would, hence, be to use better 
instruments than those factually used by PT. 
3.2 Extensions Carried Out 
Not all of the potential extensions mentioned in the last subsection are carried out 
here. In fact, we limit ourselves to the most straightforward ones, namely to the 
robustness of PT’s results. More specifically, five major modifications are presented 
here: (1) the dataset is enlarged, (2) an alternative measure for the distinction between 
presidential and parliamentary systems is used, (3) the measures for productivity are 
recalculated for the year 2000 instead of the year 1988, (4) a number of control 
variables are added and (5) total government expenditure is used in addition to central 
government expenditure. We now move on to describe these extensions. 
The first – and supposedly also the most important – extension consists of enlarging 
the database. We decided to include all countries that carried out free elections in the 
1990ies (according to Golder 2005) and for which a sufficient amount of data were 
available. This led to the inclusion of 31 additional countries (a list can be found in 
appendix 1). This changes the composition of the dataset and some of the changes are 
highlighted here: the proportion of African countries has increased which we consider 
as a plus since African countries are underrepresented in the PT dataset. Relatedly, 
our average country is closer to the equator than PT’s. Our average country is 
significantly smaller, the population is younger, and the ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization is higher than in the smaller sample. In terms of economic variables, 
per capita income is smaller as is labor as well as total factor productivity. In terms of   13
religion, the proportion of both catholic and protestant countries is higher, and, 
inversely, the proportion of Confucian countries lower. On average, countries are 
younger in the broad sample, and the proportion of the population that speaks English 
as their first language is higher than in the PT sample. 
Amazingly, the average of the Gastil index (that was used by PT as their cut-off 
criterion) is slightly lower in our sample, implying that on average, the countries in 
our extended dataset enjoy a higher degree of political freedom and civil liberties 
(based on the average of their ratings from 1990 to 1999).3 On the other hand, the 
extension countries are newer democracies, government efficiency is lower and 
corruption significantly higher (table A3 in the appendix contains a comparison of the 
statistical averages of the PT dataset, the added countries as well as newly created 
larger dataset). 
For coding the various aspects of electoral rules, we relied on a dataset provided by 
Matt Golder (2005) who defines a presidential regime as “one in which the 
government serves at the pleasure of the elected president. The president may be 
directly or indirectly elected; the important feature is that the president selects and 
determines the survival of government” (ibid., 117). In turn, the coding of the 
variable proxying for the form of government was done by consulting the countries’ 
constitutions (the coding for both the electoral rules as well as the form of 
government can be found in appendices 1 and 3). Drawing on an alternative measure 
of government form serves to check the robustness of PT’s results and is our second 
extension. 
The third extension is a recalculation of both labor and total factor productivity. PT 
take the two measures of productivity from Hall and Jones (1999) who computed 
both measures for the year 1988. The indicators used to explain variation in 
productivity are, however, from the period between 1990 and 1998 which means that 
they could not have possibly caused the variation in productivity. This is why we 
decided to refresh the productivity estimates and recalculated them for the year 2000. 
Following Hall and Jones (1999), we calculate productivity as the residual of a Cobb-
                                                 
3   Incidentally, PT’s cutoff criterion is also fulfilled in our more extended sample: The Central African 
Republic as the worst performer scores a 4.2 which is still well below 5, PT’s cutoff score.   14
Douglas production function.4 Instead of the output per worker for 1988 the output 
per worker for the year 2000 was taken from the Penn World Tables 6.1 by Heston et 
al. (2002). The physical capital stock was calculated as an arithmetic mean of the 
capital stock calculated by Hall and Jones for 1988 and the aggregate investment in 
the period 1990-2000 again taken from Heston et al. (2002). An assumed depreciation 
rate of 6 percent for the capital stock means that the value of the 1988 capital stock 
has nearly lost half its value by the year 2000. Missing data for the 1988 capital stock 
in countries like Croatia, Ukraine, Slovakia were imputed by taking the data of the 
"mother countries" USSR, Yugoslavia and CSSR. The human capital variable is 
based on the average number of years that citizens above the age of 15 of the 
respective country spent in schools. It is assumed that school attendance is subject to 
decreasing marginal returns. Accordingly, the first years spent in school are supposed 
to lead to higher marginal returns than the last years spent there. Like Hall and Jones 
(1999), we assume a rate of return of 13.4 percent for the first four years of education, 
of 10.1 percent for the next four years and of 6.8 percent for education beyond the 
eighth year. The data for the years of schooling were taken from 
www.worldbank.org/data. Missing data were imputed by augmenting the data in Hall 
and Jones for 1985 (originally provided by Barro and Lee 1993) with the average 
growth rate in schooling between 1985 and 2000. 
PT use the average of the Corruption Perception Index (produced by Transparency 
International) as a proxy for government efficiency. More precisely, they draw on the 
average over the years 1995 through 2000. Again, this is problematic because most of 
the explanatory variables cover the period from 1990 to 1998. We have, hence, 
decided to use the average of the CPI for the years 2000 to 2005. On top of being 
more adequate conceptually, this period has the additional advantage of being 
available for a larger number of countries. 
When estimating the effects of constitutional rules on fiscal policy, PT have relied on 
both central government expenditure and revenue. True, they have included a dummy 
variable for federalism, but the ratio between central and non-central government 
                                                 
4   Hall and Jones (1999) assume a production function Yi=Kiα(AiHi)1-α with Yi=Output per worker in 
country i (taken from the Penn World Tables), Ki=stock of physical capital in country i, Hi=amount of 
human capital-augmented labor used in production in country i and Ai=labor-augmenting measure of 
productivity in country i. After rearranging the equation, Ai as the residual is calculated assuming α to 
be 1/3.   15
expenditure (revenue) might not be the same in all unitary and all federal states. We 
have, hence, decided to check the robustness of their results by estimating the effects 
of the constitutional variables on total government expenditure (revenue). The 
variable TOTEXP is taken out of the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002) and 
covers the Government share of real GDP using a fixed base, the reference year being 
1996. We have used the average of this indicator for the 1990s. 
4 Estimations 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
This section serves to test the robustness of PT’s results after having carried out the 
modifications proposed in the last section of the paper. In order to be certain that 
possible differences are not due to different datasets, different software programs etc., 
we begin all estimations by replicating the original model of PT. In order to keep our 
results as reader-friendly as possible, all tables are constructed in an identical fashion: 
(1)  The first column simply reports the results as found in PT (2003). 
(2)  The second column contains an exact replication of that model. 
(3)  The third column contains the regression based on the larger dataset. 
(4)  If there are more columns, the underlying modifications (e.g. an updated 
dependent variable, additional controls and so on) are explicitly specified. 
In order to ensure readability of the paper, we do not display all the control variables 
included in the various regressions but simply the ones that we are interested in here.5 
In order not to overburden the paper, we confine ourselves to OLS estimates here (or 
WLS where PT used them, too).6 Following PT, in parentheses underneath the 
coefficients we display standard errors, significance levels are indicated as *** (one 
percent), ** (five percent), and * (ten percent). 
                                                 
5    The complete estimates can be assessed via our webpage at: http://www.uni-
marburg.de/fb02/insecon. 
6    Due to problems of data availability, we do not replicate PT’s estimates with regard to central 
government expenditures on social services and welfare as a percentage of GDP as well as the Budget 
Surplus.   16
4.2 Fiscal Policy 
Central Government Expenditure 
The replication of the PT estimate leads to exactly identical results (column 2). With 
regard to presidential regimes, inclusion of the additional countries reduces both the 
size of the coefficient as well as its level of significance. This is true regardless of 
whether countries are coded according to PT or to Golder (columns 3, 6 and 7; the 
other columns are introduced to make comparability between the various approaches 
with an identical number of observations possible) implying that the lacking 
robustness of the variable is not due to the different coding introduced here. 
Concerning the effects of a majoritarian electoral system on central government 
expenditure, the PT results appear quite robust. We have replicated all other estimates 
of PT regarding central government expenditure but refrain from reporting them 
individually here as the results are always quite similar: whereas the PRES variable is 
not robust to the inclusion of additional countries, the MAJ variable is. 
We now move on to estimate the effects of government form and electoral system in 
combination. Remember that PT found that government size would be decreased by a 
“whopping 10% of GDP” (PT 160) if a parliamentary proportional country 
introduced a presidential-majoritarian system. This result is not robust to the 
extension of the survey. It does not matter whether one follows the PT classification 
of the PRES variable or uses Golder’s classification instead. More specifically, 
parliamentary systems with majoritarian electoral rules display central government 
expenditure of some 7% less than the default group of countries that are a 
parliamentary democracy with a proportional electoral system. This is in line with the 
findings reported above: central government expenditures are driven much more by 
the electoral rules than by the form of government.   17
Table 1: Size of Government (CGEXP) 
Column 
Number  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Sample  85  85 116 85  85 116  116 85 116 
Pres-Variable  PT PT PT PT GO PT GO PT PT 





































Observations  80 80 92 70 70 82 82 77 89 
Adj.  R²  0.63 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.49 0.38 
J.-B.  Test    2.97 3.77 3.42 2.91 2.88 2.92 1.49 1.97 
These OLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 6.1, p. 159), i.e. they all include the 
following controls, not shown in the table: LYP, GASTIL, AGE, TRADE, PROP65, PROP1564, FEDERAL, OECD, AFRICA, 
ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in parentheses are White heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent 
level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-Variable 
originally used by Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly created PRES-Variable based on the coding of Golder 2005. The 
interaction term between MAJ and PRES never turned out to be significant. 
 
As soon as total government expenditure is used as the dependent variable (columns 8 
and 9), the picture changes substantially again: In this case, neither the form of 
government nor the electoral system display any significant influence. In both the 
original PT sample (column 8) and in our extended sample (column 9), only two 
variables turn out to be highly significant: first, OECD membership leads to a 
significantly lower level of total government expenditure (on the one percent level of 
significance; OECD membership is, c.p., correlated with an expenditure level of some 
12% less than non OECD members!). Secondly, and as expected, the age structure 
has an influence on total government expenditure: the higher the proportion of the 
population above 65, the higher the expenditure level, the higher the proportion of the 
population aged between 15 and 64, the lower the expenditure level. 
Government Revenue 
Estimating the effects of the constitutional variables on government revenue rather 
than government expenditure does not really change the picture: extending the   18
country sample makes the PRES variable insignificant for explaining differences in 
government revenue. This is true regardless of whether PT’s or Golder’s coding is 
used. It is also noteworthy that the MAJ variable which remained insignificant in the 
original estimate (column 1) now turns out to be significant at the ten percent level. 
This is, astonishingly, true not only when the sample is broadened but also when it is 
diminished in size (in order to be able to use the Golder variable instead of PT’s 
PRES). These general insights remain true for all variations in which government 
revenue serves as the dependent variable which is why we refrain from reporting 
them here. The Jarque-Bera statistic in columns 2 and 3 indicates that the residuals 
are not normally distributed; the actual values for Botswana and Brazil were both 
more than 2.5 standard deviations away from their predicted values. Exclusion of 
these two countries makes the Jarque-Bera statistic insignificant, i.e. secures the 
normal distribution of the residuals. 
Table 2: Size of Government (CGREV) 
Column Number  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Sample 85  85  116  85  85  116  116 
Pres-Variable PT  PT  PT  PT  GO  PT  GO 





























Observations 76  76  88  66  66  78  78 
Adj. R²  0.58  0.58  0.57  0.61  0.62  0.62  0.62 
J.-B. Test    6.97**  12.11*** 2.59  1.94  2.60  2.50 
These OLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 6.1, p. 159), i.e. they 
all include the following controls, not shown in the table: LYP, GASTIL, AGE, TRADE, PROP65, PROP1564, 
FEDERAL, OECD, AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in 
parentheses are White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated 
parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the 
Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-Variable originally used by Persson and 
Tabellini, GO is a newly created PRES-Variable based on the coding of Golder 2005. The interaction term 
between MAJ and PRES never turned out to be significant. 
 
In sum, presidential systems are not robustly correlated with either central 
government expenditure or central government revenue. Majoritarian systems are   19
significantly correlated with lower government expenditures even in the larger 
sample.7
4.3 Political Rents 
PT use three proxies for political rents, namely the amount of graft as contained in the 
governance indicators provided by Kaufmann et al. (1999). The other indicator also 
focusing on corruption is the so-called Corruption Perception Index provided by 
Transparency International. The variable government effectiveness is also drawn 
from the governance indicators provided by Kaufmann et al. (1999). PT put an 
emphasis on the graft indicator as it is available for the largest number of countries. 
Graft 
Comparing the PT estimate with our replication reveals some differences which can 
be easily explained: the original estimate is based on governance indicators (here 
GRAFT) that were collected in 1997 and 1998. In our replication, we rely on the 
average of the GRAFT variable for the years from 1996 to 2004.8 Based on this 
longer period, the significance of the PRES variable vanishes whereas the effect of 
both the proportion of individually nominated candidates (PIND) as well as district 
magnitude (MAGN) prove to be robust; in fact, the coefficient of both variables is 
somewhat higher than in the original estimates. 
These results are reconfirmed when various extensions are carried out, namely a 
larger sample is used (columns 3 and 6), an alternative classification for presidential 
form of government is employed (column 5), or the two extensions are combined 
(column 7). The Jarque Bera statistic in columns 6 and 7 indicates outliers, these are 
Chile and Mali. Notice that this table was produced on the basis of weighted least 
squares. Replicating the results on the basis of OLS (instead of WLS) does not 
change the results dramatically: the PRES variable remains insignificant whereas 
PIND and MAGN lose in significance but remain significant on the ten percent level. 
                                                 
7   In addition, both central government expenditure and central government revenue are significantly less 
in federal states (on the five percent level). PT also observed this correlation but it was not significant 
in their sample. 
8   Note that we follow PT here in applying weighted least squares. They argue that weighted least squares 
would help to reduce noise from measurement error (p.191). The weights are given by the (inverse) 




Table 3: Rent Seeking (GRAFT) 
Column  Number  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample 85  85  116  85  85  116  116 
Pres-Variable  PT  PT  PT PT GO PT GO 











































Observations  78 78 90 69 69 79 79 
Adj.  R²  0.84 0.89 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.90 
J.-B.  Test    0.93 1.55 0.02 0.10  7.30**  8.92** 
These WLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 7.1, p. 192), i.e. they 
all include the following controls, not shown in the table: LYP, GASTIL, AGE, TRADE, LPOP, EDUGER, 
FEDERAL, OECD, AVELF, PROT80, CATHO80, CONFU, AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, 
COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in parentheses are White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent 
level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-
Variable originally used by Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly created PRES-Variable based on the coding of 
Golder 2005. Column 1 relies on GRAFT for the years 1997 and 1998, whereas GRAFT in column 2 relies on the 
period from 1996 to 2004, hence the deviations. The interaction term between MAJ and PRES never turned out to 
be significant. 
 
Summing up our results so far, it is the electoral system rather than the form of 
government that explains the variation in the dependent variables. It is, hence, 
interesting to have a closer look at the details of the electoral system to ascertain what 
specific institutional provision is responsible for the difference. Following PT 
(192/195), we include three variables proxying for the electoral system into one 
equation in table 4 (although they are highly correlated among themselves). As soon 
as the sample is extended, the MAJ variable has additional explanatory power. This 
also remains the case if the sample size is reduced (columns 4 and 5; due to countries 
covered in the Golder data). The replications also show that the effect of PIND is not   21
very robust: based on a smaller sample (columns 4 and 5 again) it is significant on the 
five percent level, based on the extended Golder set (columns 6 and 7), it is not 
significant anymore. This is further re-enforced if the estimate is done on the basis of 
OLS: in the 79 country sample, only MAGN turns out to be significant. 
Table 4: Rent Seeking (GRAFT), MAJ included  
Column  Number  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample 85  85  116  85  85  116  116 
Pres-Variable  PT  PT  PT PT GO PT GO 

























































Observations  78 78 90 69 69 79 79 
Adj.  R²  0.84 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 
J.-B.  Test    0.57 0.79 0.62 0.63 1.05 1.51 
These WLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 7,1, p. 192), i.e. they 
all include the following controls, not shown in the table: LYP, GASTIL, AGE, TRADE, LPOP, EDUGER, 
FEDERAL, OECD, AVELF, PROT80, CATHO80, CONFU, AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, 
COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in parentheses are White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent 
level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-
Variable originally used by Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly created PRES-Variable based on the coding of 
Golder 2005. The interaction term between MAJ and PRES never turned out to be significant. 
 
Corruption 
The next couple of regressions use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as the 
dependent variable (tables 5 and 6). Due to data availability, the larger sample 
contains only 3 more countries than the original PT dataset. These are Albania,   22
Mongolia, and Ghana.9 It is noteworthy that this minor extension makes PIND lose 
its significance entirely and MAGN shrink from the one to the ten percent level. 
Other modifications (using the Golder variable instead of that used by PT) also lets 
MAGN use its significance. As in many tables before, the form of government does 
not seem to have any impact, in this case on the CPI. 
Table 5: Rent Seeking (CPI9500) 
Column  Number  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample 85  85  116  85  85  116  116 
Pres-Variable  PT  PT  PT PT GO PT GO 











































Observations  68 68 71 60 60 62 62 
Adj.  R²  0.88 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 
J.-B.  Test    2.06 1.09 1.38 1.15 1.01 0.96 
These WLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 7.1, p. 193), i.e. they 
all include the following controls, not shown in the table: LYP, GASTIL, AGE, TRADE, LPOP, EDUGER, 
FEDERAL, OECD, AVELF, PROT80, CATHO80, CONFU, AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, 
COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in parentheses are White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent 
level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-
Variable originally used by Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly created PRES-Variable based on the coding of 
Golder 2005. 
 
For their estimates of the effects of their constitutional variables on the Corruption 
Perception Index, PT relied on CPI data from 1995 to 2000. An additional check on 
the robustness of their results is to use a different period which we did by choosing 
the period from 2000 to 2005. This period has the additional advantage of being 
available for a larger number of countries. In a number of estimates, the presidential 
variable now reaches conventional significance levels. The correlation is, however, 
                                                 
9   Ghana was already contained in the PT sample but no data were inserted.   23
not robust to the extension of the country sample (columns 3, 6 and 7). The 
proportion of individually elected candidates (PIND) as well as the size of electoral 
districts (MAGN) is, however, very robust. 
Table 6: Rent Seeking (CPI0005) 
Column  Number  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample 85  85  116  85  85  116  116 
Pres-Variable  PT  PT  PT PT GO PT GO 











































Observations  n.  a.  79 87 68 68 76 76 
Adj.  R²    0.94 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 
J.-B.  Test    0.35 0.32 0.39 0.21 1.49 1.76 
These WLS-regressions are a modification of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 7.1, p. 193), i.e. they all include the 
following controls, not shown in the table: LYP, GASTIL, AGE, TRADE, LPOP, EDUGER, FEDERAL, OECD, 
AVELF, PROT80, CATHO80, CONFU, AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The 
numbers in parentheses are White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the 
estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. J.–B. is the 
value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-Variable originally used by 
Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly created PRES-Variable based on the coding of Golder 2005. 
 
In sum, the form of government does not have a robust effect on political rents. 
Although the electoral rule (majoritarian vs. proportional) becomes significant in a 
number of extensions, it is not significant in all equations. What seems to have the 
most important effect is the size of the electoral districts: the smaller it is, the higher 
the predicted level of graft or corruption.10
                                                 
10   It seems noteworthy that the two single most important predictors for low political rents are (1) a high 
per capita income (in log form) and (2) OECD membership.   24
4.4 Productivity 
The last dependent variable analyzed by PT is the effect of their constitutional 
institutions on labor as well as total factor productivity. The data they use for the two 
productivity measures are taken from Hall and Jones (1999) who calculated them for 
the year 1988. They find that both presidential as well as majoritarian systems are 
harmful to both measures, albeit in an insignificant way. We extend PT’s findings in 
two directions here: first, we ask whether we find the same effects of the 
constitutional variables on productivity using the larger dataset. Second, we 
recalculate both productivity measures for the year 2000 and compare the coefficients 
with those obtained from the other regressions. 
Output Per Worker 
In line with our previous results on fiscal policy and government effectiveness, the 
presidential variable is not significantly robust for explaining differences in output 
per worker (LOGYL) either (table 7). This is also the case with regard to MAJ for the 
extended sample (column 3) as well as the modified coding of the presidential 
variable (columns 5 and 6). As soon as the more recent data for output per worker are 
used, MAJ regains the same level of significance as in the PT estimates. What is 
striking – and this is why it is explicitly reported in the table – is the very high level 
of significance that the age-variable (defined as the age of democracy; with the US as 
the oldest democracy coded as 1) has for explaining differences in per capita output. 
This means that the longer a country has been democratic, the higher the output per 
worker. The economic effect is huge: if a young democracy switched to being 200 
years old (i.e. roughly the age of the U.S.), this would imply a threefold higher output 
per worker. This finding is at odds with Olson (1982) as PT also note (216). 
   25
Table 7: Output per Worker (LOGYL, LOGYL2000) 
Column  No.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sample  85  85 116 85  85 116 85 116 
Pres-Variable  PT PT PT PT GO  GO PT PT 

















































Observations  74 74 84 63 63 73 73 79 
Adj.  R²  0.73 0.73 0.75 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.68 0.71 
J.-B.  Test    3.47 0.49 4.24 3.68 0.12 0.97 0.50 
These OLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 7.4, p. 204), i.e. they all 
include the following controls, not shown in the table: LAT01, FRANKROM, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, FEDERAL, 
AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in parentheses are White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly 
different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-Variable originally used by Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly 
created PRES-Variable based on the coding of Golder 2005. 
 
Above, we saw that it was often the details of the electoral systems that proved to be 
the most significant explanatory variables. This is why we substitute PIND and 
MAGN for MAJ to see if this is also true with regard to output per worker (table 8). 
And indeed, the results of PT prove to be extremely robust.11 It seems noteworthy 
that after having increased the size of the sample and used more recent data for output 
per worker, the size of the coefficients for both PIND and MAGN markedly 
increases. We can, hence, be fairly confident that the details of the electoral system 
have a systematic impact on output per worker. 
 
                                                 
11   We were, however, unable to identify the reasons for the differences between colums 1 and 2 as we are 
here dealing with an exact replication of PT’s estimate.   26
Table 8: Output per Worker (LOGYL, LOGYL2000), PIND and MAGN instead of MAJ 
Column  No.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sample  85  85 116 85  85 116 85 116 
Pres-Variable  PT PT PT PT GO  GO PT PT 

































































Observations  73 73 83 62 62 72 72 78 
Adj.  R²  0.76 0.76 0.78 0.69 0.69 0.76 0.73 0.77 
J.-B.  Test    2.38 0.25 3.01 3.31 0.01 0.27 0.86 
These OLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 7.4, p. 204), i.e. they all 
include the following controls, not shown in the table: LAT01, FRANKROM, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, FEDERAL, 
AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in parentheses are White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly 
different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-Variable originally used by Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly 
created PRES-Variable based on the coding of Golder 2005. 
 
Total Factor Productivity 
Analyzing total factor productivity yields somewhat different results: A first look at 
table 9 shows that MAJ never reaches conventional significance levels when used to 
explain differences in total factor productivity. Neither an extension of the sample nor 
using more recent total factor productivity estimates changes anything here. Columns 
7 and 8 contain a surprise, at least prima facie: in many of the results presented until 
now, the PRES variable did not reach conventional levels of significance, here, it 
becomes significant, the negative sign indicating that presidential regimes tend to be 
connected to lower levels of total factor productivity. In the estimates of PT, 
presidential regimes were correlated with both sounder fiscal policies and lower 
levels of political rents. In most of our replications, we did not find the PRES variable 
to have significant effects on these two groups of variables. Based on these results,   27
one could have predicted that presidential regimes should not have any significant 
effect on total factor productivity either. Yet, in our theoretical section, a number of 
arguments were presented according to which presidential regimes could be 
problematic, e.g. because the likelihood that a presidential regime becomes 
unconstitutional was predicted to be higher than the corresponding likelihood of a 
parliamentary regime. This reduces the degree of predictability of a regime and could 





Table 9: Total Factor Productivity (LOGA, LOGA2000) 
Column  No.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sample  85  85 116 85  85 116 85 116 
Pres-Variable  PT PT PT PT GO  GO PT PT 

















































Observations  73 73 81 62 62 70 73 79 
Adj.  R²  0.50 0.50 0.54 0.43 0.44 0.52 0.51 0.51 
J.-B.  Test    3.06 3.21 1.92 2.13 1.70 3.78 2.52 
These OLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 7.4, p. 204), i.e. they all 
include the following controls, not shown in the table: LAT01, FRANKROM, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, FEDERAL, 
AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in parentheses are White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly 
different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-Variable originally used by Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly 
created PRES-Variable based on the coding of Golder 2005. The interaction term between MAJ and PRES never 
turned out to be significant. 
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Paralleling the estimation strategy applied to labor productivity, MAJ is, again, 
substituted for PIND and MAGN (table 10). Here, the significance of PIND crucially 
depends on the kind of modification carried out. Our attempt to exactly replicate the 
findings of PT already led to a higher level of significance which was almost 
maintained after the sample had been broadened by an additional eight observations. 
As soon as the sample size was reduced (in order to be able to use the Golder variable 
instead of PT’s PRES), PIND does not have additional explanatory power anymore. 
This changes again as soon as more recent data for total factor productivity are used. 
Both the coefficient as well as the standard error in columns 2 and 8 are roughly 
identical. The effect of district magnitude seems to be rather robust. There is one 
exception though: if Golder’s presidential variable is used (column 6), MAGN also 
loses its significance. The residuals in two of the estimates (columns 3 and 7) are not 
normally distributed. Guyana and Romania are the outliers in these regressions (2.5 
std.dev.). 
Table 10: Total Factor Productivity (LOGA, LOGA2000), PIND and MAGN instead of MAJ 
Column  No.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sample  85  85 116 85  85 116 85 116 
Pres-Variable  PT PT PT PT GO  GO PT PT 

































































Observations  72 72 80 61 61 69 72 78 
Adj.  R²  0.52 0.54 0.56 0.44 0.45 0.53 0.55 0.55 
J.-B.  Test    4.56 6.66** 1.73  2.26  3.45 6.91** 2.99 
These OLS-regressions are a replication (and modification) of Persson/Tabellini 2003 (table 7.4, p. 204), i.e. they all 
include the following controls, not shown in the table: LAT01, FRANKROM, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, FEDERAL, 
AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM, COL_UKA, COL_ESPA, COL_OTHA. The numbers in parentheses are White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ or ‘*’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly 
different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. J.–B. is the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. PT refers to the PRES-Variable originally used by Persson and Tabellini, GO is a newly 
created PRES-Variable based on the coding of Golder 2005.   29
 
In the theoretical section, the possibility that both labor as well as total factor 
productivity are impacted upon by fiscal policies and government effectiveness is 
alluded to. To test for this possibility empirically, we have simply included central 
government expenditure and graft as independent variables into the equations. It turns 
out that both PRES and MAJ remain insignificant for explaining variation in both 
labor as well as total factor productivity but that GRAFT is highly significant for 
explaining differences between countries (on the one percent level for LOGYL and 
the five percent level for LOGA) whereas central government expenditures do not 
display a significant influence on productivity. In this specification, the AGE variable 
is not significant anymore, either. 
To sum up: presidential systems seem to have a consistent negative impact on both 
forms of productivity although this result is not highly robust as the PRES variable 
does not consistently reach conventional levels of significance. Similarly, the MAJ 
variable always has a negative sign. Different from the PRES variable, it does, 
however, never reach conventional levels of significance. It is, however, noteworthy 
that a higher proportion of individually elected candidates (PIND) is robustly linked 
to higher levels of both labor and total factor productivity. Likewise, large districts 
implying higher levels of political competition are also linked with higher 
productivity levels. Additionally, the age of democracy seems to be highly – and 
positively – correlated with higher levels of productivity. 
5 Conclusions and Outlook 
In this paper, we have replicated and extended the analysis of Persson and Tabellini 
(2003). The most important extension was that the sample size was increased from 85 
to 116 countries. Other extensions include more recent data for the dependent 
variable (for graft, the corruption perception index, labor productivity and total factor 
productivity). Our most important result is that in most regressions, use of the 
extended dataset makes the variable for presidential regimes insignificant. PT’s 
results with regard to electoral systems are, however, largely confirmed. 
These results do not lack a certain irony. The central question was, after all: Do 
constitutional rules matter? It seems that it is the details of the electoral systems that 
matter most. This is ironic as in many (if not most) countries, these details are not 
dealt with on the level of the constitution. The result also teaches us that God is in the   30
details in the sense that it is not the coarse MAJ variable that is most significant but 
rather the specifics of the electoral system. 
If it is the more fine-grained variables that prove most significant with regard to the 
electoral system, could it not be that something similar is true with regard to forms of 
government? Potential variables could include aspects such as whether the president 
is elected directly or indirectly and whether his term is renewable or not. Getting even 
more fine-grained, one could ask for the exact electoral formula that is used to elect a 
president (plurality, absolute majority, qualified majority in case of direct elections; 
composition of the electoral college in case of indirect elections). 
In the theoretical section, the possibility that the factual implementation of 
institutions is not equivalent with their de jure status has been mentioned. PT’s 
dataset is, however, largely based on de jure institutions. It would seem worthwhile to 
think up controls to ensure that de jure and de facto institutions are congruent. 
In section 3.1, four possible extensions of the original results are discussed. In this 
paper, we have largely confined ourselves to one dimension, namely to the sample 
size and the coding of the explanatory variables. Natural next steps that suggest 
themselves include the empirical identification of the transmission channels through 
which the electoral system has such important effects on the three groups of 
variables. Another extension consists in endogenizing the constitutional variables. 
This promises to be extremely important as only an endogenization of the relevant 
variables will get us closer to answering the central question asked by PT, namely do 
constitutional rules matter? As of now, we cannot exclude that it is not the 
constitutional institutions that drive the results but rather third variables which might 
determine both the constitutional variables as well as the economic effects. These 
could be informal institutions, ideologies, but also the kind of social capital on which 
societies can rely. In other words: we seem to have some way ahead of us before 
being able to answer the question if – and to what degree – constitutional rules 
matter. 
Moving to the more mundane, it seems highly desirable to extend the analysis to 
other constitutional institutions beyond the two institutions explicitly analyzed by PT: 
The effects of direct democracy as well as of federalism immediately come to mind. 
Other institutions that may be not as obvious include bicameralism, but also spending 
limits, term limits, and supreme audit institutions.   31
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Appendix 1 







MAJ MIXED  DIS- 
TRICTS 
SEATS MAGN LIST  CLIST PIND PINDO 
Albania  1992  4.1  0 1 110  145  0.76  35 1  0.76  0.76 
Andorra  1993  1.1  0 1  7  28  0.25  14 1  0.50  0.50 
Antigua  1981  3.3 1  0  17  17  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Armenia  1991  4.1  0 1 113  161  0.70  48 1  0.70  0.70 
Benin  1991  2.6  0 0  16  77  0.21  77 1  0.00  0.00 
Cape  Verde  1991  2.0  0 0  22  76  0.29  76 1  0.00  0.00 
Centr. Afric. 
Republic 
1993  4.2 1  0  97  97  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Croatia  1991  3.9  0 1  46  133  0.35  87 1  0.35  0.35 
Dominica  1978  1.3 1  0  21  21  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Grenada  1984  1.6 1  0  15  15  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Guyana  1992  2.6  0 0  1  53  0.02  53 1  0.00  0.00 
Kiribati  1979  1.2 1  0  23  39  0.59 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Kyrgyzstan  1991  4.1 1  0  70  70  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Liechtenstein  1990  1.0  0 0  2  25  0.08  25 1  0.00  0.00 
Lithuania  1991  1.8  0 1  71  141  0.50  70 1  0.50  0.50 
Macedonia*  1991 3.3 0.5  0.5  103  120  0.85  18  1  0.85  0.85 
Madagascar*  1993 3.3  0  0.5  89  149  0.60  108  1  0.28  0.28 
Mali  1992  3.2  1 0  55  132  0.42  132 1  0.00  0.00 
Marshall 
Islands 




1991  1.2 1  0  12  12  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Mongolia  1992  2.7 1  0  51  76  0.67 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Nauru  1968  1.9 1  0  8  18  0.44 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Panama  1989  2.7  0 1  40  71  0.56  45 0  0.37  1.00 
San  Marino  1992  1.0  0 0  10  60  0.17  60 0  0.00  1.00 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 
1991  2.1  0 0  7  55  0.13  55 1  0.00  0.00 
Slovenia  1991  1.7  0 0  8  88  0.09  88 0  0.00  1.00 
Solomon 
Islands 
1978  1.4 1  0  49  49  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
1983  1.4 1  0  11  11  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
St.  Lucia  1979  1.5 1  0  17  17  1.00 0  0  1.00 1.00 
Suriname  1991  3.2  0 0  10  51  0.20  51 0  0.00  1.00 
Vanuatu  1980  2.1 1  0  16  49  0.32 0  0  1.00 1.00 
* Change in Electoral System 
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Table A2 Data on Forms of Government 
Country  PRES  Comment on Classification 
Albania  0  The government of Albania is the „Council of Ministers“ which can, according to art. 34 of 
the Constitution, be displaced by Parliament, hence PRES = 0. 
Andorra  0  Constitutional principality; two representatives of the princes serve as heads of state, but a 
prime minister accountable to Parliament is the representative of the executive, hence PRES = 
0. 
Antigua  0  The King (Queen) of England is head of state which is represented by a governor which only 
acts after having been asked to do so by a cabinet which is directly accountable to Parliament; 
hence PRES = 0. 
Armenia  0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 74 of the 
constitution, Parliament can depose the government, hence PRES = 0. 
Benin  1  The President heads the executive and can only be forced to retire after committing crimes or 
in case of serious illness, hence PRES = 1. 
Cape 
Verde 
0  Government consists of the prime minister, ministers and secretaries of state. According to 
art. 214 of the constitution, Government can be deposed of by Parliament, hence PRES = 0. 
Central 
Afr. Rep. 
0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 40 of the 
constitution, Parliament can depose the government, hence PRES = 0. 
Croatia  0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 113 of 
the constitution, Parliament can depose the government by a vote of no confidence, hence 
PRES = 0. 
Dominica  1  The President heads the executive and can only be forced to retire after committing crimes or 
in case of serious illness, hence PRES = 1. 
Grenada  0  The King (Queen) of England is head of state which is represented by a governor which only 
acts after having been asked to do so by a cabinet which is directly accountable to Parliament; 
hence PRES = 0. 
Guyana  1  The President heads the executive and can only be forced to retire after committing crimes or 
in case of serious illness (according to art. 179f. of the constitution), hence PRES = 1. 
Kiribati  0  Art. 45 of the constitution states that the cabinet in its entirety is accountable to Parliament, 
hence PRES = 0. 
Kyrgyzsta
n 
0  Although Kyrgyzstan knows a President with numerous powers, the head of government is 
the prime minister. His government can be forced to step down by way of a vote of no 
confidence according to art. 71 of the constitution, hence PRES = 0. 
Liechtenst
ein 
0  Government needs the confidence of Parliament (art. 78 of the constitution). PRES = 0. 
 
Lithuania  0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 101 of 
the constitution, Parliament can depose the government by a vote of no confidence, hence 
PRES = 0. 
Macedoni
a 
0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 92 of the 




0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to arts. 91 and 
94 of the constitution, Parliament can depose the government by a vote of no confidence, 
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Country  PRES  Comment on Classification 
Mali  0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 78f of 
the constitution, Parliament can depose the government by a vote of no confidence, hence 
PRES = 0. 
Marshall 
Islands 
0  According to art. 5 of the constitution, cabinet in its entirety forms the executive and is 





1  The President heads the executive and can only be forced to retire after committing crimes or 
in case of serious illness, hence PRES = 1. 
Mongolia  0  According to art. 25 of the constitution, Parliament has the exclusive competence to appoint 
the government; the deposition of the President is expressly mentioned, hence PRES = 0. 
Nauru  0  Art. 24 of the constitution states that in case the President loses Parliament’s confidence, the 
Parliament can depose of the government and call new elections, hence PRES = 0. 
Panama  1  No legal basis for the deposition of the President by Parliament, hence PRES = 1. 
San 
Marino 
1  The term of office is only 6 months during which Parliament has no influence on the 
composition of government, hence PRES = 1. 
Sao Tome   
and 
Principe 
0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 117 of 
the constitution, Parliament can depose the government by a vote of no confidence, hence 
PRES = 0. 
Slovenia  0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 116 of 
the constitution, Parliament can depose the government by a vote of no confidence, hence 
PRES = 0. 
Solomon 
Islands 
0  The King (Queen) of England is head of state which is represented by a governor which only 
acts after having been asked to do so by a cabinet which is directly accountable to Parliament; 
hence PRES = 0. 
St. Kitts   
and Nevis 
0  The King (Queen) of England is head of state which is represented by a governor which only 
acts after having been asked to do so by a cabinet which is directly accountable to Parliament; 
hence PRES = 0. 
St. Lucia  0  The King (Queen) of England is head of state which is represented by a governor which only 
acts after having been asked to do so by a cabinet which is directly accountable to Parliament; 
hence PRES = 0. 
Suriname  1  The President heads the executive. It is accountable to Parliament according to art. 90 of the 
constitution but can only be forced to retire after committing crimes or in case of serious 
illness, hence PRES = 1. 
Vanuatu  0  Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 43 of the 
constitution, Parliament can depose the government by a vote of no confidence, hence PRES 
= 0. 
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Table A3: Comparing the Persson/Tabellini dataset with the 31 countries added and the new larger 
dataset 
Variable  Unit  PT Ø  New Ø  All Ø  Category12
COUNTRIES 
Number 85  31  116  NUMB 
LAT01  0-1 0.32  0.25  0.30 
AFRICA  % 12.94  19.35  14.66 
ASIAE  % 15.29  3.23  12.07 
LAAM  % 27.06  25.81  26.72 
OECD  % 27.06  0.00  19.83 
GEO 
LPOP  ln 2.23  -0.75  1.44 
PROP1564  % 62.07  60.30  61.60 
PROP65  % 8.45  6.83  8.02 
EDUGER  % 88.58  85.01  87.94 
AVELF  0-1 0.29  0.35  0.30 
POP 
RGDPH  $ 6.689  4.744  6.303 
LYP  Ln 8.41  8.12  8.35 
TRADE  [(IMP + EXP) 
/GDP] x 100  78.77  99.82  83.25 
FRANKROM  ln 2.87  3.37  2.94 
LOGYL  ln 9.23  8.08  9.09 
LOGA  ln 8.17  7.42  8.10 
ECON 
PROT80  % of population  17.46  18.93  17.85 
CATHO80  % of population  40.69  43.65  41.48 
CONFU  % of countries  7.06  3.23  6.03 
REL 
T_INDEP  0-250 120  111  117 
COL_UKA  0-1 0.28  0.29  0.28 
COL_ESPA  0-1 0.06  0.08  0.06 
COL_OTHA  0-1 0.22  0.36  0.26 
ENGFRAC  0-1 0.14  0.23  0.15 
EURFRAC  0-1 0.40  0.42  0.40 
COL 
AGE  0-1 0.21  0.06  0.17 
CON2150  % 10.59  0.00  7.76 
CON5180  % 29.41  12.90  25.00 
CON81  % 49.41  87.10  59.48 
FEDERAL  % 15.66  6.45  13.16 
GOVEF  10-0 4.21  5.60  4.55 
GRAFT  10-0 4.17  5.56  4.51 
CPI9500  10-0 4.83  6.56  5.01 
CPI9804  10-0 5.02  6.71  5.22 
GASTIL  1-7 2.44  2.32  2.41 
INST 
                                                 
12   PT = 85 countries of Persson/Tabellini, New = 31 added countries, All = all 116 countries, Categories: 
NUMB =   Number of Countries, GEO = geographical information, POP = population, ECON 
= economy, REL = religion,   COL = colonial history, INST = institutions, FIS = fiscal data, 
ELEC  = election systems,   GOV = form of government   37
 
Variable  Unit  PT Ø  New Ø  All Ø   
CGEXP  % BIP  28.82  31.32  29.16 
CGREV  % BIP  26.49  26.84  26.54 
SPL  % BIP  -2.18  -3.73  -2.42 
FIS 
MAJ  % 38.82  50.00  41.81 
MIXED  % 10.59  22.58  13.79 
SEATS  Number 215  67  176 
LIST  Number 114  34  93 
PIND  0-1 0.46  0.59  0.49 
PINDO  0-1 0.61  0.71  0.63 
MAGN  0-1 0.47  0.58  0.50 
ELEC 
PRES  % 38.82  22.58  34.48  GOV 
 
 
List of Variables (definitions and sources) 
The data describing the 85 countries covered by Persson and Tabellini (PT) taken out of the dataset that they have  
made available (http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/folder.php?vedi=823&tbn=albero&id_folder=180). The additional  
31 countries were coded closely following the PT definitions. All variables used in this paper are described here,  
again closely following PT. 
 
AFRICA: 
Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Africa, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2005) 
AGE: 
Age of democracy defined as AGE = (2000 – DEM_AGE) / 200, with values varying between 0 und 1. 
ASIAE: 
Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in East Asia, 0 otherwise; source: Golder (2005). 
AVELF: 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized) averaging five 
sources; source: La Porta (1999). 
CATHO80: 
Percentage of a country’s population belonging to the Roman Catholic religion in 1980 (younger states are counted based on 
their average from 1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999) and  CIA (2005) for Lithuania, Nauru, Marshall Islands and San 
Marino. 
CGEXP: 
Central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item Government Finance-Expenditures in 
the IFS, divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100; source: International Monetary Fund (2006): International 
Financial Statistics Online Service. 
CGREV: 
Central government revenues as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item Government Finance-Revenues in the IFS, 
divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100; source: International Monetary Fund (2006): International 
Financial Statistics Online Service. 
CLIST: 
Dummy variable for closed party lists taking on 0 if the list is open and 1 if it is closed. Sources are constitutions, electoral 
laws, election reports and other internet sources.    38
 
COL_ESP: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a former colony of Spain or Portugal, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2005). 
COL_ESPA: 
Spanish colonial origin, discounted by the number of years since independence (T_INDEP) and defined as COL_ESPA = 
COL_ESP * (250 – T_INDEP) / 250. 
COL_OTH: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former colony of a country other than Spain, Portugal or the United Kingdom, 
0 otherwise; source: CIA (2005). 
COL_OTHA: 
Defined as COL_OTHA  = COL_OTH * (250 – T_INDEP) / 250; see also COL_ESPA. 
COL_UK: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former U.K. colony, 0 otherwise, source: CIA (2005). 
COL_UKA: 
Defined as COL_UKA = COL_UK * (250 – T_INDEP) / 250; see also COL_ESPA. 
CONFU: 
Dummy variable for the religious tradition in a country, equal to 1 if the majority of the country’s population is 
Confucian/Buddhist/Zen, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2000). 
CPI0005: 
Corruption Perception Index measuring perceptions of abuse of power by public officials. Average over 2000 – 2005. Index 
values between 0 and 10, lower values meaning lower levels of corruption (recoded from the original version); source: 
Transparency International and Internet Center for Corruption Research (http://www.icgg.org/). 
CPI0005_WT: 
Weighted CPI0005. Weight is 1/(Std. Dev. of single surveys within CPI0005). 
CPI9500: 
Like CPI0005 but average for the period 1995 – 2000; source: Transparency International and Internet Center for Corruption 
Research (http://www.icgg.org/). 
CPI9500_WT: 
Weighted CPI9500. Weight is 1/(Std. Dev. of single surveys within CPI9500). 
DATASET: 
Dummy variable with 0 for countries covered in PT, 1 for all additional countries. 
DEM_AGE: 
First year of democratic rule in a country, corresponding to the first year of a string of positive yearly values of the variable 
POLITY for that country that continues uninterrupted until the end of the sample, given that the country was also an 
independent nation during the entire time period. Does not count foreign occupation during WW II as an interruption of 
democracy; source: additions on the basis of the variable NEWDEM (Golder 2005) that identifies the year of a first 
democractic election in that country. 
DISTRICTS: 
Number of electoral districts in a country; source: Variable DISCTRICTS from Golder (2005). 
EDUGER: 
Total enrollment in primary and secondary education as a percentage of the relevant age group in the country’s population; 
source: UNESCO (2006): Education statistics. 
ENGFRAC: 
Fraction of a country’s population that speaks English as a native language; source: Hall & Jones (1999).   39
EURFRAC: 
Fraction of a country’s population that speaks one of the major languages of Western Europe: English, French, German, 
Portuguese, or Spanisch; source: Hall & Jones (1999). 
FEDERAL: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has a federal political structure, 0 otherwise; source: Forum of Federations (2002): 
List of Federal Countries. 
FRANKROM: 
Natural log of tradeshare forecasted by Frankel and Romer’s gravity model of international trade which takes both a 
country’s population and its geographical location into account; source: Hall & Jones (1999). 
GASTIL: 
Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights, each index is measured on a 1-to-7 scale with 1 representing the 
highest dgree of freedom. Countries whose averages are between 1 and 2.5 are called “free”, those between 3 and 5.5 
“partially free” and those between 5.5 and 7 as “not free”; source: Freedom House (2005). 
GOL_MAJPAR: 
MAJPAR with PRES according to Golder 2005. 
GOL_MAJPRES: 
MAJPRES with PRES according to Golder 2005. 
GOL_PRESBAD: 
PRESBAD with PRES according to Golder 2005. 
GOL_PROPRES: 
PROPRES with PRES according to Golder 2005. 
GOVEF: 
Government effectiveness according to the Governance Indicators of the World Bank. Combines perceptions of the quality 
of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies into a single indicator. 
Values between 0 and 10, where lower values signal higher effectiveness; source: Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
GOVEF9604: 
Government effectiveness according to Kaufmann; average values for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000; source: Kaufmann, 
D., Worldbank (2005): Governance Indicators: 1996-2004. 
GOVEF9604_WT: 
Weight for GOVEF9604. Weight is 1/(Std. Dev. of single surveys within GOVEF9604). 
source: see GOVEF9604. 
GRAFT: 
Graft according to the Governance Indicators of the World Bank focusing on perceptions of corruption. Values between 0 
and 10, where lower values signal higher effectiveness; source: Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
GRAFT9604: 
Graft according to the Governance Indicators of the World Bank; average values for 1996, 1998 and 2000; source: 
Kaufmann, D., Worldbank (2005): Governance Indicators: 1996-2004. 
GRAFT9604_WT: 
Weight for GRAFT9604. Weight is 1/(Std. Dev. of single surveys within GRAFT9604). 
source: see GRAFT9604. 
INIT_DEBT: 
Initial endebtment of a country as a share of its GDP in the first year for which data was available (INIT_DEBT = (Domestic 
Debt + Foreign Debt)/GDP); source: International Monetary Fund (2006): International Financial Statistics Online Service.   40
 
LAAM: 
Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Latin America, Central America, or the Caribbean, 0 otherwise; 
source: CIA (2005). 
LAT01: 
Rescaled variable for latitude, defined as the absolute value of LATITUDE divided by 90 and taking on values between 0 
and 1; source: CIA (2005). 
LATITUDE: 
Distance from the equator (in degrees), ranging between -90° and +90°, source: CIA (2005). 
LIST: 
Number of lower-house legislators elected through party list systems; sources: constitutions, electoral laws, election reports 
and other internet sources. 
LOGA: 
Natural logarithm of total factor productivity, measured in 1988, source: Hall & Jones (1999). 
LOGA 2000: 
Natural logarithm of total factor productivity, own calculation for 2000 based on Hall & Jones (1999). 
LOGYL: 
Natural logarithm of output per worker, measured in 1988, source: Hall & Jones (1999). 
LOGYL 2000: 
Natural logarithm of output per worker, own calculation for 2000 based on Hall & Jones (1999). 
LPOP: 
Natural logarithm of total population (in millions); sources: Penn World Tables, Center for International Comparisons at the 
University of Pennsylvania/ CICUP (2006) and CIA (2005).  
LYP: 
Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in constant dollars (chain index) expressed in international prices, base year 1985; 
average for the years 1990 – 1999; source: Column RGDPCH Penn World Tables, Center for International Comparisons at 
the University of Pennsylvania/ CICUP (2006). 
MAGN: 
Inverse of district magnitude, defined as DISTRICTS / SEATS. MAGN is a measure for the degree of political competition 
and can take on values between 0 and 1. Small values of MAGN indicate a high degree of political competition.  
MAJ: 
Dummy variable for electoral systems, equal to 1 if all the lower house in a country is elected under plurality rule, 0 
otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered. Macedonia switched during the observation period from 
MAJ to a mixed system and was coded MAJ = 0.5 and MIXED = 0.5; sources: variable ELECSYSTEM_TYPE from Golder 
(2005) as well as constitutions, electoral rules, election reports and other internet sources. 
MAJPAR: 
= MAJ * (1 – PRES) 
MAJPRES: 
= MAJ * PRES   41
 
MIXED: 
Dummy variable for electoral systems, equal to 1 if the electoral formula for electing the lower house in a country is neither 
strict plurality rule nor strict proportionality, 0 otherwise. Semiproportional (or mixed) electoral rule identifies those 
electoral systems characterized by both proportional and first-past-the-post representation for allocating seats. Madagascar 
changed in the observation period from a proportional system (MAJ = 0 und MIXED = 0) to a mixed system and was coded 
MIXED = 0,5 (and MAJ = 0); sources: variable ELECSYSTEM_TYPE from Golder (2005) as well as constitutions, electoral 
rules, election reports and other internet sources. 
OECD: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 for all countries that were members of the OECD; source: OECD (2006). 
PIND: 
Computed as 1 – LIST / SEATS; can take on values between 0 and 1. PIND indicates the proportion of individually elected 
candidates (i.e. those not on a party list). 
PINDO: 
Computed as 1 – LIST / SEATS * CLIST (CLIST indicating close lists with 1 or open lists with 0); can take on values 
between 0 and 1. PINDO indicates the proportion of directly elected candidates plus those elected via open lists. 
PRES: 
Dummy variable for government forms, equal to 1 in presidential regimes, 0 otherwise. Only regimes in which the 
confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not chief 
executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most semipresidential and premier-
presidential systems are classified as parliamentary source: constitutions and electoral laws. 
LRES_GOL: 
PRES according to Golder 2005. 
PRESBAD: 
= PRES * GASTIL 
PROP1564: 
Percentage of a country’s population between 15 and 64 years old among entire population; source: CIA (2000). 
PROP65: 
Percentage of a country’s population over the age of 65 in the total population; source: CIA (2000). 
PROPRES: 
= (1 – MAJ) * PRES 
PROT80: 
Percentage of the population in a country professing the Protestant religion in 1980 (younger states are counted based on 
their average from 1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999) and  CIA (2005) for Lithuania, Nauru, Marshall Islands und San 
Marino. 
SEATS: 
Number of seats in lower or single chamber for the latest legislature of a country. Average for 90ies; source: the variable 
SEATS from Golder (2005). 
SPL: 
Central government budget surplus (if positive) or deficit (if negative) as a percentage of GDP, based on  „DEFICIT (-) OR 
SURPLUS“ as share of GDP average for 1990-1999; source: International Monetary Fund (2006): International Financial 
Statistics Online Service. 
T_INDEP: 
Number of years since indepence; T_INDEP = 2000 – year of independence; source: CIA (2005).   42
 
TOTEXP: 
Total Government Expenditure as percentage of BIP; source: Heston et al. (2002). 
TRADE: 
Sum of exports plus imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP; source: Worldbank (2005). 
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